

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON PLENARY MEETING, JUNE 29, 1977
(SALT TWO-1253)

1. AT PLENARY MEETING JUNE 29, I MADE STATEMENT ON US PROPOSAL FOR AGREED STATEMENT CONCERNING LOCATIONS OF SIDES' CURRENT ICBM TEST RANGES, STATING THAT SUCH AGREEMENT WOULD INCREASE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE CONCERNING UNDERTAKINGS OF ARTICLE VII AND HELP ENSURE THAT SIDES HAVE SAME UNDERSTANDING OF TERM "TEST RANGE." I REBUTTED PREVIOUS SOVIET CONTENTION THAT AGREED STATEMENT WOULD RUN COUNTER TO PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION BY NTM AND THAT LACK OF SUCH STATEMENT IN INTERIM AGREEMENT MEANT THAT THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR SUCH STATEMENT IN NEW AGREEMENT.

2. IN SEMENOV'S STATEMENT ON PARAGRAPH XVI 3 (DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES), HE REPEATED SOVIET POSITION THAT CURRENT TESTING PRACTICES SHOULD BE EXEMPT FROM PROHIBITION ON DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES, ADDING THAT CURRENT SOVIET AND US TESTING PRACTICES DO NOT INCLUDE PRACTICES WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES. HE ALSO REPEATED SOVIET VIEW THAT TELEMETRY TRANSMISSION METHODS AND CONTENT CONSTITUTED PART OF PURELY INTERNAL ASPECTS OF A SIDE'S TESTING PRACTICES AND MAY IN TIME BE MODIFIED FOR PRACTICAL

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REASONS. HE ASSERTED THAT METHODS OF TRANSMITTING TELEMETRIC INFORMATION DURING TESTING HAVE NO RELATION TO QUESTION OF DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES.

3. IN BILATERAL, I EXPLAINED THAT US PROPOSALS FOR DESIGNATION OF TEST RANGES AND AGREEMENT ON THROW-WEIGHT AND LAUNCHER-WEIGHT NUMBER WERE AIMED AT SOLVING PROBLEMS BEFORE THEY AROSE IN SCC.

SEMENOV REPLIED THT ONE REASON SOVIETS DO NOT WANT TO GIVE NUMBERS IS THAT THEY DO NOT WANT "THE CAMEL TO GET HIS NOES UNDER THE TENT." IF SOVIETS TELL US THINGS THAT US KNOWS, US NEXT MAY ASK FOR INFORMATION IT MAY NOT KNOW, AND NEXT FOR INFORMATION IT DOES NOT KNOW. SIDES COULD GO DOWN SUCH A ROAD FOREVER, WITH US ASKING SOVIETS FOR INFORMATION SUCH AS SUBMARINE LENGTH AND SPEED. I AGREED THAT WE SHOULD NOT ASK FOR IRRELEVANT INFORMATION, BUT THAT IF AGREEMENT INCLUDED A LIMITATION ON SUBMARINE SPEED, THEN SUCH A NUMBER WOULD BE RELEVANT. SUCH WAS THE CASE OF LAUNCH-WEIGHT AND THROW-WEIGHT. SEMENOV REPEATED SOVIET ARGUMENTS ON DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES, NOTING THAT US "BEST EFFORTS" PROPOSAL WAS "SUPERFLUOUS." HE SUGGESTED THAT WE ADD DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES TO AGENDA FOR OUR JUNE 30 PRIVATE MEETING ON MIRV VERIFICATION.

4. IN ROWNY/TRUSOV-BELETSKY BILATERAL, TRUSOV INSISTED US WAS EQUATING TRANSMISSION OF TELEMETRY WITH DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES AND ASSERTED THAT US POSITION WAS AIMED AT HOBBLING SOVIET TELEMETRY PRACTICES. HE PRSSED ROWNY FOR EXAMPLES FOR HOW TELEMETRY METHODS COULD IMPEDE VERIFICATION. ROWNY RESPONDED THT US DID NOT EQUATE TRANSMISSION OF TELEMETRY WITH DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES. ROWNY SAID THAT US SIMPLY DID NOT WANT TO EXEMPT TELMETRY OR ANYTHING ELSE FROM OBLIGATION NOT TO DELIBERATELY CONCEAL.

5. IN MCNEILL-SCHNIETER/KARPOV-SMOLIN BILATERAL, SCHNEITER
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EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THERE COULD BE MORE THAN ONE STAGE IN CONVERSION PROCESS AT WHICH IT WAS CLEAR CONVERSION FOR MIRVS WAS UNDERWAY, AND THAT US PROPOSAL SOUGHT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT LAUNCHER COUNTED IN MIRV AGGREGATE WHEN FIRST OF SUCH STAGES WAS REACHED. KARPOV ACKNOWLEDGED SOVIET UNDERSTANDING THAT POINT-IN-TIME WHICH SOVITES HAD IN MIND, WAS ONE PRIOR TO WHICH IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO BE CERTAIN WORK WAS CONVERSION FOR MIRVS. HE AND SMOLIN SHOWED INTEREST IN SCHNEITER QUESTION OF SOVIET VIEW ON POSSIBLE LANGUAGE FOR SUBPARA VI.3(A), "WHEN WORK ON THEM FIRST REACHES A STAGE WHICH DEFINITELY INDICATES" CONVERSION FOR MIRVS, AND UNDERTOOK TO STUDY IT.

6. IN STOERTZ-BEECROFT/PAVLICHENKO BILATERAL, PAVLICHENKO STATED THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME PROBLEMS WITH SOVIET TESTING PRACTICES IMPEDING VERIFICATION PRIOR TO VLADIVOSTOK, BUT THAT NO CURRENT SOVIET TESTING PRACTICE WOULD IMPEDE VERIFICATION OF VLADIVOSTOK LIMITATIONS. HE SAID THAT SOVIET SIDE DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW TELEMETRY WAS RELEVANT TO VERIFICATION OF ANY PROVISION OF SALT TWO AGREEMENT. HE SAID IT PERHPAS COULD BE RELEVANT TO "QUALITATIVE" LIMITATIONS IN SALT THREE. STOERTZ RESPONDED THAT THERE WERE SUCH QUALITATIVE PROVISIONS IN THE AGREEMENT WE WERE WORKING ON, CITING AS

EXAMPLES DISTINGUISHING MIRVS FROM MRVS AND DETERMINING THROW-WEIGHT AND LAUNCH-WEIGHT. PAVLICHENKO SAID THAT OVERALL EFFECT OF US PROPOSALS ON DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK, BOMBER VARIANTS, AND SS-16/SS-20 ISSUEE WAS THAT US "WANTS TO COUNT SOME HUNDREDS" OF ITEMS WHICH SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED.

7. IN LTC JOHNSON/JOURAVLEV-KUKLEV BILATERAL, JOHNSON ILLUSTRATED DUAL CAPABILITY PROBLEM BY EXAMPLE OF LAUNCHER WHICH COULD NOT LAUNCH SS-16 SO LONG AS SWITCH ON LAUNCHER WAS SET FOR SS-20, BUT THAT BY SIMPLY TURNING SWITCH TO SS-16, IT COULD BE GIVEN THAT CAPABILITY. KUKLEV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DUAL ACAPABILITY WAS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE, BUT THAT BECAUSE OF PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS A SIDE WOULD NOT CONSTRAIN ITS DESIGNS SO AS TO PROVIDE SUCH A DUAL CAPABILITY.

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